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"NIXONOMICS -- A RECORD OF ECONOMIC POLICY
MISJUDGMENT AND MISMANAGEMENT", DEMOCRATIC POLICY GROUP CHARGES

WASHINGTON, April 22 -- In a report to the 1972 Democratic Platform Committee, the Economic Affairs Committee of the Democratic Policy Council held the Nixon Administration's mismanaged economic policies responsible for "accelerated inflation, rising unemployment, the first recession in a decade, a staggering loss of production, the first international trade deficit in many decades, and a forced reduction in the international value of the dollar."

Prepared under the chairmanship of Gardner Ackley, and vice chairmanship of Walter W. Heller, both former CEA chairmen, the report is the fifth in a series of issue papers to be released by Democratic National Chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien, under a new convention procedure recommended by the O'Hara Commission.

In reviewing the deterioration of the economy under Mr. Nixon, the report charges: "The disastrous outcome of Nixonomics stems directly from the notorious 'game plan'. It was anchored in the stubbornly held belief that the only effective way to curb inflation is to tighten the screws on the economy until rising unemployment will limit wage advances and dwindling markets will hold down prices."

While agreeing that the New Economic Policy "is at least a step in the right direction," the report notes that "the delay was costly and we will pay the penalty for years to come." The Democratic economists also question the traditional Republican "trickle down" approach of tax cuts for business, instead of raising consumer purchasing power, pointing out that the new policies cannot create the millions of new jobs needed to reduce the unemployment rate.

The report further notes that the Phase II mechanisms are not adequate to the job. The Price Commission's present resources and policies cannot meet the Administration goal of 2 1/2 percent inflation rate by year end.

Democratic Program

The report outlines a Democratic program for "recovery and stabilization," with particular emphasis on attaining the 4 percent unemployment goal as a minimum objective. Key components of this program are:

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-- Fiscal flexibility. (1) Tax flexibility through a routine surcharge -- positive, negative or zero -- to ensure quick response to changes in the economy. (2) Expenditure flexibility to better coordinate appropriations and total expenditures. (3) Automatic flexibility in expenditures, such as unemployment insurance, welfare programs, "cyclical" revenue sharing with states and municipalities to cushion economic swings.

-- Size of total budget. While urging further development of budgetary evaluation to improve efficiency and eliminate waste, the report emphasizes that substantial new expenditure programs to solve urgent social problems will probably be necessary and must be examined in the light of the nation's needs and priorities.

-- Tax reform. If more revenues are needed, the first source should be tax reform. Reasoning that many present loopholes are outmoded and inequitable, the report states that the individual and corporate taxes "are badly in need of reform." The report notes that, failing reform or if large revenue increases are needed, an increase in the federal tax rate is "preferable to a national sales tax."

-- Wage and Price Policy. The report recommends a permanent, flexible and equitable system to "control creeping inflation at high employment." Based on the consent and participation of those whose wages and prices are controlled, such a system must have specific legislative authority.

In releasing the report, O'Brien emphasized that the views and recommendations contained in the economic report are those of the members of the Committee on Economic Affairs.

"We do not presume to speak for anyone in the Democratic Party other than those who directly had a role in the preparation of these reports. However, we are confident that these views will be afforded the most serious consideration by the Platform Committee members in writing the 1972 Democratic Platform," O'Brien said.

Other reports to be released include education, freedom of information, farm income, women's political power, housing, national regional development policy, the urban crisis, intelligence and security, the environment, consumers, and international affairs.

The full text of the report of the committee on economic affairs follows:

ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES IN ECONOMIC POLICY

Gardner Ackley, Chairman
Walter W. Heller, Vice Chairman

NIXONOMICS

The Economic Record of the Nixon Administration

Judged by any objective standard, the economic policies of the present administration have been a dismal failure, as even Mr. Nixon was forced to admit in his abrupt turnabout last August 15.

The administration came into office with bright promises of assuring prosperity, halting inflation, and strengthening the international position of the dollar. Instead, it achieved accelerating inflation, rising unemployment, the first recession in a decade, a staggering loss of production, the first international trade deficit in many decades, and a forced reduction in the international value of the dollar.

Let's look at the sorry record of Nixonomics -- a record of economic policy misjudgment and mismanagement so bad it must be seen to be believed:

- Jobs. From the preceding eight Republican years, the Kennedy Administration inherited a legacy of 5 million workers, or 7 per cent of our labor force, unable to find jobs. Eight Democratic years succeeded in reducing unemployment to 3.3 per cent -- the lowest level since the Korean War. Three Nixon years scuttled this achievement; all during 1971, five million or more were again jobless, and the unemployment rate had zoomed to 6 per cent. Unemployment exceeded 10 per cent among non-whites, and 17 per cent among teen-agers.

- Inflation. This increase in joblessness was the deliberate and purposeful Nixon prescription for curbing inflation. But inflation, far from being restrained, accelerated. Consumer prices had risen 4.2 per cent in 1968, not a good record. Yet, as unemployment rose, so did the rate of inflation. Prices increased 5.4 per cent in 1969, 5.9 per cent in 1970 and, despite the "freeze" in August, 4.3 per cent in 1971.

- Production. As Nixonomics took hold, our economy turned slack and sluggish. Between 1969 and 1971, total U. S. output (Gross National Product in constant prices) increased only 2 per cent. Total industrial output in 1971 was actually 3.8 per cent lower than in 1969. In contrast, between 1961 and 1968 total output had increased at an average rate of 5.1 per cent a year, and industrial production at an average of 6.7 per cent per year.

- In the last quarter of 1968, 87.2 per cent of our industrial capacity was being utilized. In the last quarter of 1971 use of capacity had plummeted to 74.0 per cent, a low unequalled since the Republican recession in 1958.
- Operating the economy below full employment during 1970 and 1971 has already cost us \$128 billion loss of potential output. By election day, the loss will have reached \$175 billion. During 1973, it will reach and surpass \$1,000 per capita.
- Profits. Business profits declined sharply throughout the Nixon Administration. As a percentage return on stockholders' equity, corporate profits in 1970 were lower than in any year since the recession year 1961. And 1971 showed only a modest recovery.
- Take Home Pay. For those at work, even the sharp wage increases of recent years have barely kept up with rising prices, while lagging production has cut the average working week and held down workers' incomes. For a fully-employed factory worker with three dependents, average "real" take-home pay in 1971 was no higher than in 1968.
- Dollar Devaluation. The U. S. balance of payments has steadily deteriorated. We experienced an adverse balance of merchandise trade in 1971 for the first time in many decades, nearly \$3 billion. Our total foreign deficit in 1971 approached \$30 billion. Dollar devaluation and suspension of convertibility were the inevitable results.
- Fiscal Blunders. The fiscal record of this administration verges on the unbelievable. Because its fumbling policies retarded rather than stimulated recovery, the resulting loss of revenue has produced by far the largest budget deficits since World War II. In fact, the total deficit of the four Nixon years will amount to about one-third of the aggregate deficits of all the preceding years in our history. A record has also been set for miscalculations; never before have revenue estimates been so far in error. Yet another record has been set in the manipulation of budget figures to make them look good and to justify policies than cannot be justified.

The Theory of the Old "Game Plan"

The disastrous outcome of Nixonomics stems directly from the notorious "game plan". It was anchored in the stubbornly held belief that the only effective way to curb inflation is to tighten the screws on the economy until rising unemployment will limit wage advances, and dwindling markets will hold down prices. As soon as he took office, the President sharply rejected any extension of the efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to obtain the support of labor and business in moderating their wage and price objectives in the overriding public interest -- a virtual invitation for wage and price increases.

The Republican formula sought to check inflation solely by retarding economic growth and creating unemployment -- with the inevitable cost in terms of human distress and social unrest. Retarded growth and rising unemployment were achieved -- only too successfully -- but the expected tradeoff failed to materialize: even in recession, price increases did not slow down, they sped up. Conceivably, if the screws were turned down long and hard enough to cause a real depression, inflation would be retarded; but even the Nixon Administration could not contemplate so high a price.

As serious a mistake as it was to adopt this "game plan", much less forgivable was the protracted failure to recognize that it was not working. The February 1971 Economic Report proclaimed that the year would be one of rapid recovery. It set a target for GNP that was almost universally recognized as wholly unrealistic (given the policies adopted), even by some of Mr. Nixon's own economic advisers. When Bureau of Labor Statistics officials commented, as they had always been expected to do, on the significance of the disappointing economic statistics the Bureau was releasing, the reaction was not to take a hard look at what was happening but rather to muzzle the officials whose interpretations were honest but distasteful. When the Democratic Congress granted the President the authority to control prices and wages directly, he condemned such controls, and kept insisting that he would never use the authority -- up to the final days before his abrupt confession of failure last August.

The New Economic Policy

Confession of error, though belated, is at least a step in the right direction. But the delay was costly, and we will pay the penalty for years to come. The bankrupt course of clamping down on the economy, while letting inflation rage unchecked, contributed largely to the swollen budget deficits of 1972 and 1973, and clearly aggravated the deterioration of our balance of payments and the collapse of the dollar. The failure to take firm steps earlier to hold down rising prices led directly to the very large wage increases in key industries in 1970 and 1971, which workers demanded and received to keep pace with soaring living costs. This failure has already guaranteed higher costs and selling prices in the years ahead, further impairing the competitiveness of American products on international markets.

Even when Mr. Nixon finally decided to use the price-wage authority the Congress had given him, and took the drastic steps that had become necessary on dollar devaluation, his fiscal policies retained the traditional Republican bias. Instead of concentrating on raising consumer purchasing

power, he persisted in the "trickle down" theory. The tax package he proposed in August would have given business \$5 billion in tax relief from an investment credit, on top of \$3 1/2 billion of "depreciation reform" granted earlier the same year. The Democratic Congress managed to boost the benefits to consumers a little, to pare the investment credit to \$3 1/2 billion, and to make the depreciation reform less generous. But the entire \$5 1/2 billion of business tax benefits would have provided a far more effective stimulus had it been made directly available to the consumer. So would the \$2 1/2 billion cut in excise taxes on automobiles, if spread throughout the community rather than limited to new car buyers. Moreover, Mr. Nixon proposed to cancel most of the fiscal stimulus from tax cuts by a \$4 3/4 billion cut in federal spending.

His policies were thus quite unable to create the millions of new jobs needed to absorb the annual growth of our civilian labor force, plus the additional millions of jobs needed if we are to move back toward full employment. Even under the New Economic Policy, job creation has barely kept pace with labor force growth, and unemployment remains close to the intolerable 6 per cent. Only in 1972 has Mr. Nixon finally tried to pump up expenditures, through the largest annual increase in federal spending since World War II, in a desperate but inadequate effort to get the unemployment rate moving down by election day. He hopes, of course, that the voters will not recall how many jobs his policies cost the nation.

Although the patriotic cooperation of nearly everyone made the wage-price freeze a 90-day success, Phase II has been a disappointment right from the start.

The Pay Board, in particular, has been given no clear policy guidance and flounders in a morass of inconsistent rulings which run the gamut from apparent inequity to excessive generosity. The Price Commission strives earnestly to carry out its poorly-defined mandate; but it has not been given resources adequate to do a job across the board, and it has not had the sense to concentrate them intensively on the areas that are most critical and sensitive. It has adopted an unduly generous policy of passing through cost increases with full markups, and is approving substantial price boosts by big business which are clearly inconsistent with its goal of limiting price increases to 2 1/2 per cent by year end.

The Department of Agriculture now estimates that grocery prices will rise 4 1/2 per cent in 1972. Coupled with continuing sizeable increases in the prices of services, this alone would raise the Consumer Price Index by nearly 3 per cent even before taking account of rising prices of non-food commodities that represent 40 per cent of total consumer expenditures.

On the unemployment front, the Council of Economic Advisers hopes for a reduction to 5 per cent by year-end; but this too seems most unlikely given the rapid increase both of our labor force and of labor productivity. A drop of the unemployment rate even to 5 1/2 per cent may be difficult to achieve by a program that relies on hopes rather than action. The most urgent task confronting us is to create more jobs; yet the administration accepted the Public Services jobs program enacted by the Democratic Congress only reluctantly, and has scornfully rejected the Reuss proposal for really substantial job creation.

A DEMOCRATIC PROGRAM FOR PROSPERITY

So much for the sad record of three Nixon years. What is needed for the future, to lift us out of the present morass and, in President Kennedy's words, to get America moving again? We cannot afford an administration dedicated to the proposition that 4 1/2 million workers need not find jobs in our economy. The earliest possible restoration of full employment must be our paramount goal, and a 4 per cent unemployment rate our minimum objective. What should be the Democratic program for recovery and stabilization? Some answers seem very clear; others will need careful and continuing study, which will take account of the needs and aspirations of all of our people, of the opportunities now open to us, and of the best technical knowledge of economists and other experts.

Fiscal Policy

In good measure, the adoption and unswerving pursuit of a sound and equitable fiscal policy is the key to steady prosperity and growth. Unlike Republicans, Democrats have long been aware that budget deficits are essential when the economy is operating below its potential (although the huge Nixon deficits expected for 1972 and programmed for 1973 would have been unnecessary if more timely and more effective action had been taken earlier to expand the economy). But now that a Republican administration has finally embraced deficits -- and even "full-employment" deficits -- when the economy is lagging seriously, there should remain no significant political opposition to using taxes and the budget flexibly and constructively to sustain prosperity.

Yet just as there need be no fear of deficits as such in times of economic slack so we must recognize that sound fiscal policy may require substantial surpluses in times of prosperity. Not "balancing the budget", but deciding when deficits or surpluses are needed, how big, and how to achieve them constitute the real problems of fiscal policy.

It is not our task to deal with the question of priorities within any given total of budgetary expenditures. Here we address ourselves to three other questions related to fiscal policy.

1. Obtaining necessary fiscal flexibility.

For fiscal policy to provide the necessary support for a steadily expanding economy that will fully use but not overstrain its available productive resources, means must be available promptly to offset the inevitable tendencies for fluctuations in the private demand for goods and services. This requires some combination of flexible variation of tax rates and/or budget expenditures.

- Tax flexibility. Many economists believe that the President's Budget should each year routinely propose a uniform percentage surcharge -- positive, negative, or zero -- on all personal income and profits taxes. The direction (plus or minus) and the size of the proposed surcharge would be adjusted to the proposed size of the expenditure budget, the net impact of tax changes proposed for other reasons, and the expected state of the private economy.

In almost every year of the past decade, some tax rate change has been proposed for stabilization purposes. Now it is clear that the rate change must be considered a routine question for every budget. And, unless tax rate changes proposed for other reasons happen to provide the right amount of stimulus (given proposed expenditures and the state of the economy), this annual proposed change should take the form of a positive or negative surcharge on income taxes.

Some economists further propose that the President be delegated limited discretionary authority (subject to Congressional veto) to impose a positive or negative surcharge in case unexpected changes occur in the rate of budget expenditures or in the strength of the private economy after Congress has acted for that year on taxes and on the size of the budget. It is probably too early to conclude that this authority is necessary until we have further experience with the success of systematic once-a-year adjustments.

- Expenditure flexibility. Congress needs to develop some better means than it now has to consider each year and to determine whether the total size of the President's proposed budget is appropriate in view of what it may expect to enact in the way of tax rate changes. Thereafter, it needs to have some better means than now exists to see to it that the collection of separate appropriation bills it enacts will permit expenditures of the total size that it has previously determined was appropriate.

Failing such better means Congress must accept the exercise of Presidential discretion to withhold appropriated funds -- or to release funds previously withheld -- whenever the private economy appears to shift from a previously expected path and previously enacted tax rate or spending changes therefore become clearly inappropriate. The fact that the present incumbent has used such discretion arbitrarily and unwisely does not negate the principle. Perhaps some formal authority should be provided -- authorizing (and limiting) the President's power in these respects.

• Automatic flexibility. In addition to the expenditure flexibility that arises from discretionary changes in the budget, there is now an increasing degree of automatic flexibility in expenditures, lifting them when the economy is slack and curtailing them when it booms. In addition to unemployment insurance and welfare programs, there is now -- on Democratic initiative -- a program of public service employment which automatically turns off as full employment is restored. This program needs to become a permanent feature of our stabilization policy. An even more powerful program of automatic stabilization would arise from Democratic proposals for a "cyclical" form of revenue sharing with cities and states, under which the federal government would cushion state and local governments from the revenue losses that arise from the failure of the national economic policy to maintain a prosperous and steadily expanding economy.

2. Appropriate size of the total budget

Conservatives perennially fear that federal budgets, even if soundly financed, have an inevitable tendency to expand without limit; and that the budget is already -- or is always about to become -- "too big" for the health of the economy. The fact is that the federal budget can be as big as it needs to be, so long as its financing is soundly adapted to the needs of the country.

Still, the total budget should be no bigger than it needs to be to achieve the nation's objectives. Thus, Democrats can be and are as interested as are Republicans in curbing waste and inefficiency in government, in promptly abolishing or altering old programs the need for which has changed, and in making sure that new programs are so designed as to achieve their objectives with the minimum necessary expenditure of public funds.

In recent years, new methods of budgetary evaluation have been introduced by both Democrats and Republicans. These should be continued and strengthened. Moreover, government reorganizations to improve efficiency and eliminate waste need to be the constant concern of both the Executive Branch and the Congress.

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For the future, it is quite probable that substantial new expenditure programs to solve urgent social problems will emerge from the reexamination of the nation's needs and priorities which Democrats seek. These may call for a permanent enlargement of federal revenues. If this is the case, we should not hesitate to undertake the necessary expenditure programs, up to the point at which the social value of public expenditures no longer exceeds -- at the margin -- the social value of the private expenditures which would be foregone through the enactment and collection of equitable taxes necessary to pay for those expenditures. Judgments of this kind are basically economic; but they can only be made and must be made through our democratic political processes.

3. Tax policy

• Tax reform. Whether or not significant growth of government expenditures is required, in excess of the growth of revenues from present tax sources and at present tax rates, tax reform is urgently needed. If none, or only some, of the increased revenues from tax reform should be needed, tax rates can be reduced. If, as is probable, more revenues are needed, the first source of these revenues should be from tax reform. Indeed, it appears that far-reaching reform could easily pay for almost any foreseeable increase in expenditures that may become necessary.

Tax reforms will obviously be resisted by groups now enjoying the benefits of the loopholes and inconsistencies in our tax structure; and at least some of this resistance will stem from legitimate concerns. Painless reform is not possible; the issues involve the relative weights accorded to the claims of special groups and that of the broad public interest; often the two are closely interrelated. Most present tax concessions were provided not capriciously, but with significant social or economic objectives in mind.

But many of these objectives have lost their force in today's world, and all merit careful reexamination. It is certainly not tolerable that some of the very wealthy pay no federal income taxes; that others of the rich pay much less than their appropriate share; that the poor and many with middle incomes have no comparable avenues of shelter; and that -- at any income level -- people with the same incomes but derived in different ways pay unequally the costs of government. The Nixon Administration has promised tax reform proposals, but they remain conspicuous by their absence.

Recent testimony by experts before the Joint Economic Committee has demonstrated that the individual and corporate taxes -- the nation's best and most progressive tax sources -- are badly in need of reform. At

given present rates and income levels, a comprehensive reform would yield more than \$70 billion in additional revenue from the individual income tax alone. Such a reform would, in effect, treat all sources of income equally, including realized capital gains and interest on state and local bonds; would limit depletion allowances to actual cost; and would eliminate most of the itemized deductions and the rate advantages of income-splitting for married couples. This would obviously allow massive across-the-board cuts in income tax rates, as well as a considerable expansion of spending.

Less drastic proposals might include: Revision of the capital gains tax; further reduction of depletion allowances; improvement of the minimum tax; elimination of unnecessary deductions; and revision of the tax treatment of the family. In addition, repeal of the recently-authorized liberalization of depreciation allowances seems appropriate. A combination of several of these reforms could well remove any need either for new tax sources or for the raising of tax rates, for some considerable period.

- New tax sources. If significant tax reforms cannot be enacted, or if extremely large increases in federal revenues are needed -- for example, to increase the role of federal financing in public education -- new federal taxes will inevitably be considered.

The Nixon Administration has floated a trial balloon -- but as yet no formal proposal -- for an across-the-board Value Added Tax (VAT), similar to that now imposed in most of Western Europe. It is, in effect, a national sales tax. Its revenues would be transferred to local jurisdictions, primarily for educational purposes, thus relieving the excessive burden now borne mainly by property taxes. No matter how structured, however, such a tax would be inherently regressive in the top brackets, further eroding the relatively limited progressive element that exists in our present combined federal, state, and local tax structure. Economists differ as to who bears the burden of the property tax, now the principal source of education funds. But even if the property tax is somewhat regressive, substituting one regressive tax for another seems hardly the best way of achieving the desired objective. Even moderate reform of our federal income tax structure could achieve the same revenue objectives much more equitably. And if still further federal revenues were needed -- or if tax reform were blocked -- a modest increase in personal and corporate income tax rates, now well below 1963 levels, would be preferable to a national sales tax.

Monetary Policy

We regard it imperative that monetary and fiscal policies be closely coordinated. Inappropriate monetary policy can frustrate our objectives as readily as ill-conceived fiscal policy; the two must move hand in hand. The view -- still held by some Republican economists -- that monetary policy should move independently, and merely aim at a constant rate of increase of money supply (however defined) has now been clearly discredited. Adequate growth of the money supply is important; but so are interest rates. Unduly high interest rates, such as those achieved during the first two years of Nixonomics, retard economic growth and can have a catastrophic impact on major sectors of the economy, especially construction. The rate of growth of money supply, however measured, cannot be governed by any simplistic formula, but must be constantly adjusted to the changing needs of our economy. And interest rates must not be allowed to rise to levels inconsistent with those needs.

Wage and Price Policy

Mandatory limitations on wages and prices, imposed under the Phase I freeze and the Phase II controls, were made necessary by the failure of the original Nixon game plan. Phase II, however, is working only imperfectly and often inequitably, and certainly requires immediate and extensive changes. However, at best, mandatory controls provide no long-term solution to the problem of inflation. Our economy cannot operate either efficiently or equitably for any extended period under rigid controls of this type.

If Phase II controls are adapted so as to operate effectively during the remainder of 1972, most of the need for widespread compulsory controls should have ended by a year from now. Thus the real problem for Democratic policy is the kind of longer-term price and wage restraint that must follow Phase II.

Our own post-war economic history, and that of other western nations, shows clear evidence of an endemic inflationary bias, with periods of creeping inflation followed by periods of more rapid price rise, such as that since 1968. This tendency always becomes stronger as full employment is approached.

Because the system that is needed to control creeping inflation at high employment must be thought of as essentially permanent, it must be a flexible system which will not distort economic development. And it must rest basically upon the consent and participation of those whose wages and prices are controlled, a consent which can only derive from a sense that the system operates equitably, yet can achieve the reasonable over-all price

stability which the interests of both labor and management require as well as the welfare of the community generally.

The agents of such a system must have specified authority that can only derive from legislation. The design of that legislation, and the creation and preservation of the necessary atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence among the several economic interest groups necessary to the success of such a program must be considered a major responsibility of a Democratic President and Congress.

International Economic Policies

The recent currency revaluations had probably become inevitable in good part because of the failure of Nixonomics. They should contribute substantially to the improvement of American competitiveness in international affairs.

By the same token, however, the reduced value of the dollar, along with the expected further reforms of the international monetary system, should remove most of the pressures for quantitative import controls, whether mandatory or "voluntary". We must avoid, at all costs, the neo-isolationism that seeks to insulate our markets from legitimate foreign competition. This is essential to protect the consuming public from excessive prices. It is essential, also, to foster the gradual readjustment of our economy to changing domestic and world conditions, and to guide each nation's productive activities into those lines of production in which it has comparative advantage or, at least, equality. Only through this kind of international division of labor can the economic welfare of citizens of every country -- including our own -- be maximized, and the economic development of poorer nations assured. We recognize that world competition--like domestic competition -- may have disruptive impact on some industries, but the answer should be found in adequate programs of "adjustment assistance", not in building arbitrary barriers that would only set off a train of reprisals to the injury of all.

We must, at the same time, continue our efforts to induce our trading partners to treat our exports equitably. The objective of maximizing world trade cannot be achieved by us alone; we must expect other countries to treat our international trade as fairly as we treat theirs. A major initiative in the reciprocal reduction of trade barriers on a world-wide basis is long overdue, continuing the constructive tradition followed by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson, interrupted only under the Nixon Administration.

These objectives will be possible only if international monetary reform succeeds in permitting increased flexibility of exchange rates. The Nixon Administration's efforts toward monetary reform have essentially continued along lines initiated under two Democratic Presidents; they need to be carried forward aggressively and pushed to fruition in the several years ahead.

ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES IN ECONOMIC POLICY

Gardner Ackley, Chairman
Walter W. Heller, Vice Chairman

NOTE: This statement was prepared by the Chairman and several members of the Economic Affairs Committee of the Democratic Policy Council. Although it has been submitted to all members of the Committee for comment, the statement cannot be assumed to represent the view of every member on every issue.

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